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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES A. CUTLER, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
v. ) Case No. 13554 
DALE BOWEN, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover a partnerf s share of monies 
paid by the Salt Lake City Relocation Agency to compensate 
for the disruption of business when the property leased for 
the business was taken for the Salt Palace. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
and made a final accounting of partnership monies. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the trial court's 
judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent was working as night bartender at the Havana 
Club in June, 1968. (R 60, 61) Appellant needed someone to 
run the Havana Club and requested Respondent to do so as a 
partner, with expenses and profits divided equally. (R 63, 88) 
Appellant had a ranch in Idaho which took nearly all his time 
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and Respondent was to hire, fire, pay the bills, keep the 
books, make purchases, take care of the money, and to do 
whatever was necessary to run the business. (R 64-67) Re-
spondent ran the Havana Club in that manner from June 1968 
until April 10, 1972. (R 63, 75) Appellant returned to 
his ranch except for periodic visits at which times Appellant 
and Respondent had an accounting. (JR 65, 66) 
For the calendar years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972, Ronald 
Kingston, a public accountant of thirty years' experience, 
prepared and filed partnership income tax returns, state and 
federal, in the names of Frances Cutler and Dale L. Bowen, 
dba Havana Cluh (R 78, 80, 81, 106, 108, Ex. 7P, 8P, 14P-16P) 
Such returns reflected that each partner owned a fifty percent 
(50%) interest in the partnership, that the net income was 
divided equally between them, and that Respondent devoted 
full time to the business and Appellant none. (Ex. 7P, 8P, 
14P-16P) Appellant made no objection to this accounting 
or partnership designation during this time, (R 10 7, 67) and 
counsel stipulated that Appellant had introduced Respondent 
on occasions as his "partner*" (R 162B) 
On April 10, 1972, the property on which the business was 
located was acquired by the Redevelopment Agency. (R 75, Ex. IP) 
The agency paid $10,000 to the Havana Club as a displaced 
business under the redevelopment program, such payment being 
in lieu of "moving and related" expenses. (R 116, 17D, 71-73) 
2 
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It was not paid either as the fair market value of a going 
business nor of the leasehold or fixtures used in the busi-
ness . (Ex. 17D) 
Before the business qualified for the $10,000 payment 
under the redevelopment program, the "displaced business 
concern" had to be a business that could not be relocated 
without a substantial loss of its existing patronage, 
could not be part of a commercial enterprise having another 
establishment and had to be a business which contributed 
materially to the income of the "displaced owner." (R 115, 
116, Ex. IP, 17D) The definition of "owner" included 
"the principal partners in a partnership." (Ex. 17D) 
Prior to April 10, 1972, Respondent and Defendant were 
openly looking for and negotiating the purchase of another 
club, (R 69-72, 117B, 125B-126B) during which time the first 
$5,000.00 was paid to the Havana Club, the check being made 
payable to both Respondent and Appellant. (R 75B, 71, 
Ex. 10D) Said check was endorsed by Respondent and de-
livered to Defendant in the belief and upon the representation 
that it would be used as a down payment on another club. 
(R71-73, 126B) No purchase of another club was made and 
Appellant deposited the $5,000.00 check into his own bank 
account. (R 128B) 
When the Havana Club was closed on April 10, 1972, 
Appellant removed the fixtures and inventory to his Apex 
Club, for which Respondent asserts no claim. (R 99) 
3 
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The second $5,000.00 payment from the Redevelopment 
Agency, less $100.00, was paid to both parties after this 
action was filed and is now on deposit with the American 
Savings and Loan Association in a savings account set 
up by stipulation of the parties pending the final de-
termination of this law suit. (R 73-74) 
y ISSUES 
The sole issue so far as Respondent is concerned 
is whether the trial judge had sufficient facts upon 
which to base his decision for the Respondent, but this 
issue will be discussed under the following points: 
1. This Court should affirm on appeal as there are 
sufficient facts to justify the lower court's decision 
and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
2. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that 
a partnership was formed on an oral agreement between 
Appellant and Respondent. 
3. A payment "in lieu of moving and related expenses" 
is in the nature of compensation for disruption of business 
and income must be divided equally between partners. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM ON APPEAL AS THERE ARE 
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO JUSTIFY THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION AND THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
This Court has repeatedly stated on appeal that the 
decision of the lower Court will be affirmed unless it is 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
clear that the lower court abused its discretion or had 
no basis in the facts for its decision. As was stated 
in Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981 (1958), at 
264, 
The plaintiff having prevailed below is 
entitled to have us survey the evidence, 
and every reasonable inference and intend-
ment that can fairly be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to him. 
This Court has wisely recognized that the printed word is 
sterile, lacking the inflection of the witness, the facial 
expression of the witness, the emphasis given by the witness 
as well as a number of other indicators available to the 
trial judge as he ponders his decision. As this Court 
went on to point out in the Child case at 267-26 8, 
Passing upon the credibility of witnesses 
involves to some extent the judging of what 
goes on in the minds of others and is there-
fore fraught with uncertainty. Whether one 
believes a witness is telling the truth often 
depends as much or more upon the impression 
the witness is making as upon the words he 
says. His appearance and demeanor, his man-
ner of expression and tone of voice, his 
apparent frankness or candor, or the want 
of it; his forthrightness in answering, or 
his tendency to hesitate or evade, and in 
fact his whole personality go into the composite 
effect of the testimony. This is so even 
though the hearer may not be paying particular 
attention to nor separately evaluating the 
interpretation and evaluation of testimony, 
there are also difficulties to be encountered 
because of the uncertainties found in fact 
situations themselves which must be correlated 
to the testimony of witnesses. We have here-
tofore pointed out the trial courtls advantages 
in judging the credibility of witnesses and 
5 
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determining the facts. (Zuniga v. Evansf 
87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513, 101 A.L.R.532? 
Nokes v, Continental Mining & Milling Co., 
6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954) It is due 
to these considerations that it is firmly 
established that passing on such matters is 
exclusively within his providence. 
Numerous decisions by this Court echo these thoughts, 
a few of such decisions being Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 
520, 94 P. 2d 465(1939J, Hardy V. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 
251, 495 P. 2d 28 (1972), Foster V. Blake Heights Corporation, 
Lamb v. Bangart, and Ewell and Son V. Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P. 2d 283? (1974, 1974, 1972.) 
The salient testimony and evidence upon which the trial 
judge based his decision will be more fully set out in 
Point II of this argument but will be summarized here. 
Mrs. Cutler testified that a partnership was her understand-
ing from the first. (R 63, 88) Tax returns showing Re-
spondent and Appellant each with fifty per cent (50%) own-
ership of the Havana Club were filed for the partnership 
for four years. (R 78, 80-81, 106, 108, Ex. 7P, 8), 14P-16P) 
Appellant, through his attorney, stipulated to introducing 
Respondent as his partner. (R 162B) Mrs. Cutler had broad 
powers to hire, fire, keep the books, take care of the money, 
make purchases, and do whatever was necessary to run the 
business. (R 64-67, 121B, 156B) Respondent and Appellant 
each received half of the profits of the business after the 
expenses. (R 88, 118B-119B) 
6 
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In opposition to this testimony, Appellant offered wit-
nesses who had some vague feeling but no definite knowledge 
of the business relationship between Respondent and Appellant. 
(R 116, 79B) Appellant was the exception to this generali-
zation and indicated that he intended no partnership, (R 122B) 
contrary to his actions listed above. 
The trial judge indeed had sufficient reason in testi-
mony and evidence to rule as he did and his decision should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE INDICATES 
THAT A PARTNERSHIP WAS FORMED ON AN ORAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT. 
How does one establish the existance of a partnership 
where there is no writing? Statutes give us some aid. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-3 (1953) defines a partnership as 
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4 (1953) 
sets forth rules for "determining whether a partnership exists." 
Subsection 4 indicates, 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of 
the profits of a business is prima facie 
evidence that he is a partner in the busi-
ness, but no such inference shall be drawn 
if such profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or 
otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or 
rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or 
representative of a deceased part-
ner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the 
7 
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amounts of payment vary with the 
profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the 
sale of the good will of a business 
or other property by installments 
or otherwise. 
The testimony of both Appellant and Respondent established 
that Respondent received "a share of the profits of the busi-
ness ," the presumption then being one of a partnership. As 
this Court stated in Kimball v. McCbrnick, 70 Utah 189, 259 
P. 313 (1927), the fact that two persons share profits of a 
business raises presumption of a partnership. This Court 
also indicated in Bridgman v. Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 98 P. 186 
(1908) at 389, that "the existence of a partnership may be 
implied by circumstances." 
Courts in other states have made helpful attempts to set 
criteria for partnerships. The Colorado Court in Grau v. 
Mitchell, 397 P. 2d 488, 156 Colo. Ill (1964) states that an 
express or implied contract between two or more competent 
persons to place their money, effects, labor or skill, or 
some or all of them, into a business, and to divide the profits 
and bear the losses in certain proportions constitutes a part-
nership. Oklahoma, in Johnson v. Plastex Co., 500 P. 2d 596 
(Qkla*1971) applies much the same formula. Oregon's court 
states three primary factors in determining the existence of a 
partnership: 1) the right of a party to share in the profits, 
2) liability to share losses, and 3) the right to exert some 
control over the business. Heyes v. Killinger, 235 Or. 465, 
' 8 
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385 P. 2d 747 (1963) 
The testimony and evidence in the present case meet 
these criteria, also, and help determine "intent" of the 
parties, upon which Appellant places so much emphasis. 
In the present case, intent, as is frequently true where 
testimony conflicts, must be determined by surrounding 
circumstances. Did the Appellant and Respondent act as if 
they were partners? The trial court concluded, and we 
must concur, that they did. Appellant stipulated that he 
had introduced Respondent as his partner. (R 162B) Appellant 
signed and consented to four years of income tax returns des-
ignating Respondent as his "partner" and as half-owner of 
the business. (R Ex. 7P, 8P, 14P-16P, 108, 67) Books were 
kept on a partnership basis. Appellant and Respondent both 
indicated that profits were split down the middle after ex-
penses and costs of operation were paid. (R 63, 88, 118B-
119B) Appellant left complete management, hiring, firing, 
keeping the books, taking care of the money, and all other 
essentials to running the business with Respondent subject to 
periodic accountings when the net profit was split. (R 64-67, 
119B, 121B, 107) 
Appellant indicates a number of cases which state that 
merely calling a business relationship a "partnership" does 
not make that true. Conversely, it is also true that mere 
statements that one is not in a partnership will not make 
that true. 
9 
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As indicated above, the courts weigh the surrounding 
circumstances to determine the existence of a partnership. 
Statements of Appellant that he did not want to enter into a 
partnership must be viewed in the light of what he had to gain. 
Apparently he desired the tax advantages of having someone con-
tribute toward the business license, the lease/ the taxes, 
and unemployment payments for the employees, without the re-
sponsibility of paying social security, unemployment taxes, 
and other expenses for the Respondent. Respondent was a 
"partner" at tax time for the advantages to be gained there but 
was an "employee" when it came to splitting monies paid because 
the bar had to close and its business was disrupted. 
Of particular interest is Appellant's handling of the 
first $5,000.00 check obtained from the Redevelopment Agency 
which Appellant had picked up. After a session of talk with 
one of the parties involved in the N. C. Bar, Appellant per-
suaded Respondent to endorse the check so he could pay some 
"earnest money" on the N. C. Bar, (R 126B, 72, 73) Appellant 
then deposited the check in his personal checking account with-
out paying any earnest money on the N. C. Bar or any other bar. 
(R 128B) 
Appellant discusses Myrland v. Myrland, 19 Ariz. App. 498r 
508 P. 2d 757 (1973), at length, concluding that case to be 
similar to the present case. In that case the lower court 
found insufficient facts to constitute a partnership and the 
appellate court affirmed. The case dealt mainly with domestic 
10 
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problems in unraveling separate and community property for 
disposition in divorce proceedings. Mrs. Myrland reported 
that at all times Mr. Myrland was paid an hourly wage. 
508 P. 2d at 759 Mr. Myrland testified the only time he signed 
checks was once when Mrs. Myrland was in the hospital. 508 
P. 2d at 760 There was also emphasis that Mrs. Myrland never 
filed partnership returns with Mr. Myrland, 508 P 2d at 761, 
contrary to the facts in the present case. The Myrland 
case is clearly distinguishable* 
Appellant depends for corroboration on witnesses depending 
on hearsay for their knowledge of the business relation 
Appellant and Respondent had. Mr. Wright said, "information 
was provided me" without identifying any source or background. 
(R 116) Mr. Kingsbury indicated first that the business was 
set up as a partnership (R 107) but then stated that the 
Appellant and Respondent were not "partners", as I understand 
a partner," (R. 108) without indicating what he understood as 
a partner, his definition presumably being different from 
the legal definition of a partnership. 
With Mr. Kakunes, Mr. Jones, Mr. Allen and Mr. Sisneros, 
Appellant falsely assumes that what they did not state, was not. 
That since they did not state that Respondent was a partner, 
Respondent was not a partner. These witnesses did not know 
what arrangements Appellant and Respondent had made. The 
arrangement was that each drew $100.00 per v/eek (R 87-88) and 
thereafter participated in profits or losses the business in-
11 
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curred. An indication of Respondent's honesty is that she 
refused any claim on partnership assets she felt belonged to 
Appellant, and some she had helped to purchase, such as the 
tavern license. Her income was disrupted, and Appellant 
backed out on the promise to open another bar, placing the 
$5,000.00 in his private account, and Respondent desired some 
compensation for the loss of her business. Respondent relied 
on Appellant's representations, to her detriment. If Re-
spondent were a third party, Appellant would be estopped from 
asserting that there was no partnership. 
The testimony and evidence support the trial court's 
judgment. That judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
A PAYMENT "IN LIEU OF MOVING AND RELATED 
EXPENSES" IS IN THE NATURE OF COMPENSATION 
FOR DISRUPTION OF BUSINESS AND INCOME AND 
MUST BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTNERS. 
The Relocation Agency, lacking the resources of the 
trial court, did not set themselves up as experts in the de-
termination of forms of business. The Agency operated more 
on hearsay and assumptions, wanted to avoid a controversy, 
and wanted to help the Havana Club as much as possible in the 
relocation process. (R115-117) The courts are best qualified 
to determine the type of business enterprise Appellant and 
Respondent were conducting. 
Once the determination is made that the Havana Club was 
operated as a partnership, the responsibility of the 
Relocation Agency becomes payment to the business for the 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disruption of the business. 
The guidelines, set forth in Exhibit 17D, require such 
disruption to be, 
..-a substantial loss of its existing pat-
rongage, based on a consideration of all 
pertinent circumstances including such 
factors as the type of business conducted, 
the nature of the clientele, and the relative 
importance of the displaced business of its 
present and proposed location. 
The handbook requires further that, "the business contributes 
materially to the income of the displaced owner," (Ex. 17D) 
and defines owner as "the proprietor in a sole propietor-
ship, the principal partners in a partnership, and the 
principal stockholders of a corporation..." (Emphasis added.) 
As the lower court determined Respondent to be a partner, 
she should share in the money paid to offset her loss of 
her share of the business. 
Respondent contributed more than "her time and efforts." 
As the parties split everything after expenses, she helped 
to purchase the lease, the license, the stock, and to maintain 
the facilities and clientele. Respondent made no claim 
on the equipment or inventory as she felt Appellant should 
get out of the business what he brought in. 
Appellant claims, inconsistently, that there was no relocation, 
and that there was a relocation to the Apex. The Apex, if a 
relocation of anything, was a relocation of Appellant's ranch 
in Idaho. 
Appellant's failure to talk the people at the N. C. Bar into 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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selling and failure to locate another bar cost Respondent 
her livelihood, from the business she had built up while 
the Appellant was absentee. 
The law refuses to allow a murderer to profit from his 
crime by collecting insurance on his victim. One might 
say the Appellant killed the partnership when he refused 
his partner the $5,000.00 that was rightfully hers after 
obtaining her release on "his" check for $5,000.00f by 
misrepresenting that he would use the check for earnest 
money on a bar. He should not be allowed to profit from 
the death of the partnership. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence and 
testimony amply support the trial court's judgment that 
Appellant and Respondent had a partnership at the 
Havana Club and that this Court should affirm the courtfs 
judgment. 
Respectfully, 
Don L. Bybee 
Roger S. Blavlock 
BYBEE & 3LAYL0CK 
212 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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